MIT drill causes some controversy. Why?
As we reported on August 20, government agencies conducted a tabletop drill at MIT to focus on inter-governmental responses to an attempted terrorist attack to seize Co-60 for a dirty bomb. This rather innocuous article at the Boston Globe web site mentioned that “Government sources refused to discuss difficulties that might have emerged in the drill…”
We at RadSafeInfo.com didn’t find that phrasing to be particularly inflammatory. Drills are intended to discover difficulties, and governments routinely refuse to comment on them.
But David McIntyre, the Public Affairs Officer at the NRC, seems to have taken offense and wrote a rebuttal to the Boston Globe categorically denying that there were any security concerns. You can see both articles on the News tab. Just scroll down to the date and headline because the news just keeps on happening and the stories are in chronological order.
That same day, NextGov.com published a much more extensive and very positive article on the drill, even though it had taken place five days earlier. You can also find this article on our News page.
Why was there such a reaction from the NRC? And was the NextGov article coincidental, or related? We would like to hear from anyone with further information, questions, or comments. Simply “Leave a Reply” below.
John Darrin
www.radsafeinfo.com
PS. We’re always looking for your opinion and information. Become an RSI contributor by contacting me at jcdarrin@gmail.com. Or simply respond to any post.
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I read both articles when the came out and felt that the comments from Mr. McIntyre were unnecessarily defensive. I’m intimately familiar with the NRC’s mandatory controls and can say that although they are diligently working to safeguad radiological materials, the system ultimately relies on the voluntary compliance by the owners of the material. The only way to test a facility’s capability to respond to attempted theft, sabotage, and even accidents is to drill, exercise and implement corrective actions. It is precisely because of the threat of radiological materials in the wrong hands that NRC has ordered increased controls, so downplaying the possibility is misleading. Outside of the nuclear power industry the NRC has been noticibly vague on how to actually achieve the goal of protection, so the Agreement States and licensees are doing the best they can to comply with the requirements, and academic institutions are some of the most difficult. For obvious reasons it is standard practice to correct deficiencies discovered during tabletop exercises without broadcasting them publicly.
Both Mr. Darrin and Mr. Matus misunderstand my letter to the editor. I was responding to an impression left by the article that these materials are protected only by voluntary measures that won’t be fully implemented for several years; I wanted to point out that such measures are in addition to strict controls already in place. I was not questioning or characterizing the results of the drill or the need to conduct such preparedness drills. Nor was I downplaying any security risks to the materials in question – if there was no risk, no controls would be necessary.
David McIntyre
Office of Public Affairs
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission